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"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT" IN MERRIE OLDE ENGLAND: NEW
INSIGHT FOR MARRIAGE CONFLICTS LAW FROM THE
THIRTEENTH CENTURY
DAVID

E.

ENGDAHL*

INTRODUCTION

"Marriage has a legal ubiquity of obligation."' This traditional
and fundamental premise is considered so beyond dispute that it is
seldom even expressed. The new Restatement of Conflicts, for example,
nowhere explicitly articulates this premise; yet, its whole treatment of
marriage2 and judgments pertaining thereto' assumes it. The notion
of the "universality" of marriage, the view that marriage is everywhere
(at least in Christendom4 ) the same despite variations between local
laws, is the foundation of traditional marriage conflicts law. It is because
this premise is first assumed that the problem of recognition of foreign
marriages involves the questions of choice of law, and that the full faith
and credit problem concerning judgments affecting marriage reduces
primarily to a test of the rendering courts' jurisdiction.
Other articles have demonstrated when and how this principle of
universality intruded upon the English law and what the implications of
its demise might be for choice of law regarding marriage.' In a typical
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado; Director, The Law Revision

Center. This article bears no relationship to The Law Revision Center.
1. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 113 (8th ed. 1883).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 283-86 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1969).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 69-79, 92-121 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967).
4. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 113-14 (8th ed. 1883).
But marriage is one and the same thing substantially all the Christian world
over. Our whole law of marriage assumes this; and it is important to observe,
that we regard it as a wholly different thing, a different status from Turkish or
other marriages among infidel nations.

Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & Fin. 488, 532, 6 Eng. Rep. 1239, 1255 (H.L. 1835).
5. See Engdahl, English Marriage Conflicts Law Before the Time of Bracton, 15
AM. J. Comp. L. 109 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ENGDAHL, 15 AM. J.CoMp. L. 109];
Engdahl, Proposal for a Benign Revolution in Marriage Law and Marriage Conflicts
Law, 55 IOWA L. REV. 56 (1969)

[hereinafter cited as ENGDAHL, 55 IOWA L. REv. 56] ;

Engdahl, Medieval Metaphysics and English Marriage Law, 8 J.FAm. L. 381 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as ENGDAHL, 8

J.

FAm. L. 381]. See also Engdahl, The Seculariza-

tion of English Marriage Law, 16 KAN. L. REv. 505 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
ENGDAHL, 16 KAN. L. REV. 505]; Engdahl, The Canonical and Metaphysical Background of the Classic Dutch Marriage Conflicts Rule, 15 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFr
VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ENGDAHL, 15 NEDERLANDS
42].
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case, a right might be claimed which is predicated upon "marriage." A
woman might make a claim to the benefits provided a widow under a
workmen's compensation act or a servicemen's insurance law. The normal
tendency of the courts has been to determine all such rights by determining whether the claimant was validly married. Presumptions, doctrines
of estoppel or other exceptions may sometimes operate, but the basic
proposition is that whenever a law speaks of "marriage," "wife," or
"widow," etc., it contemplates the marriage law of the state or, in a
conflicts situation, of some other appropriate place. The effect of this
approach is that entitlement to workmen's compensation benefits, for
example, is determined not pursuant to the social policy of the workmen's
compensation act, but pursuant to the different local or foreign policy
reflected in the rules governing the contracting of marriages. Those
rules, for their part, are grounded not on policies concerning the alleviation of losses resulting from industrial injuries, but rather on policies
concerning the conditions under which persons should be permitted to
cohabit.
Rejection of the notion of universality and application of the
ancient English insight would permit courts to recognize that various
statutes and rules use the word "marriage" and other words relating
thereto with different meanings. These terms as they are used, for
example, in a workmen's compensation act could be interpreted so as to
assure an award to a person dependent as a wife, even though her
marriage was technically defective according to the law of the forum
(or in a conflicts case, the law of the appropriate foreign place) regulating the contracting of marriages. Under the native English conflicts
principle, when a foreign marriage was asserted to premise a forum
claim, the English courts inquired not whether the marriage was "valid"
by the "applicable" law, but rather whether the relationship presented
by the facts was contemplated by the term "marriage" as it was used in
the forum's statute or rule on which the claim was based.'
Here the subject is full faith and credit and the implications which
the exposure of the myth of universality might carry for the recognition
of judgments concerning marriage. As with the choice of law problem,
so with the recognition of judgments, there is discovered in the antiquities of English law a perception and comprehension exceeding our
own.
THE CONTEXT OF THE MEDIEVAL FAITH AND CREDIT PRACTICE

English Courts and Roman Canon Law
6. See

ENGDAHL, 15
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At the outset it is necessary to retrace the picture of English
marriage law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In Anglo-Saxon
England marriage had been an empirical conception. There was no conception of "validity." Certain relationships might be unlawful and punishable by Church or King, but this was not considered anything less than
marriage if in fact the parties lived as husband and wife." Shortly after
the Norman Conquest, the new metaphysics of the medieval theologians
introduced the notion of validity into marriage law in England. Marriages before held unlawful came to be viewed as invalid-not really marriages at all, however indistinguishable they might appear from other
relationships. 8 But while metaphysical conceptions thus prevailed, the
requisites of a valid marriage in England retained the traditional
English forms. While continental canonists were developing the classic
canonical doctrines such as the de praesenti rule,9 their counterparts in
England simply transformed their own traditional standards of lawfulness into prerequisites for the validity of marriages." It was not until
about the turn of the thirteenth century that the efforts of the Roman
Church to displace the traditional provincial rules in England began to
have effect."1
Although the English prelates surrendered their independence, the
victory of Rome was not complete. While the churchmen accepted the
displacement of their traditions by the new Roman canons, the secular
leaders of the kingdom declined to accede to the innovations. 2 By the
traditional English canons a valid marriage could be made only by
public ceremonials-by marriage in facie ecclesiae or, as sometimes expressed, at the church door."3 The Roman doctrine, on the other hand,
as it distilled about the middle of the twelfth century, countenanced
even clandestine and unwitnessed consents contemplating the present
time-mutual consents de praesenti." Approximately in 1200, the English
7. See ENGDAHL, 8 J. FAM. L. 381, 382-89.
& Id. at 393-96.
9. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *439; note 14 infra and accompanying
text.

10. See ENGDAHL, 15 Am. J. ComP. L. 109, 118-21.

11. Professor Maitland erroneously believed that the papal innovations were
received in England during the time of Henry II. Maitland, Glanvill Revised, 6 HARv.
L. REV. 1 (1892). See ENGDAHL, 15 Am. J. COMP. L. 109, 118-21.
12. For a more comprehensive explanation of this adherence to English tradition, see
ENGDAHL, 15 AM. J. CoMP. L. 109.
13. Id. at 118-21. See H. BRACTON, DE LEGaBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE ff.
92, 302b-303 (G. Woodbine ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as BRACTON].
14. See J. DAUVILLIER, LE MARIAGE DANS LE DROIT CLASSIQUE DE L'EGLiSE
12-13 (1933); 1 A. EsMEIN, LE MARIAGE EN DROIT CANONIQUE 131-36 (2d ed. 1929) ;

Maitland, Magistri Vacarii Summa de Matrimonio, 13 L.Q. REv. 133, 136-37 (1897).
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Church accepted the Roman doctrine in lieu of its traditional rule,"5 but
the secular law, which traditionally had conformed its law of dower to
the English Church's rules determining the validity of marriages, countinued to insist upon, public ceremonials as a condition sine qua non
for dower.' Similarly, by the traditional English canons a child was
forever a bastard if born outside of marriage whether his parents subsequently married or not. The Roman canonists, on the other hand,
during the twelfth century adopted the old Roman civil law principle of
legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium, that a child born out of
marriage is made legitimate if his parents afterwards marry. Although
the English law of succession had developed theretofore in conformity
with the English Church's rules on legitimacy, when the English Church
in 1236 accepted the per subsequens rule the secular law continued to
insist upon birth after valid marriage as the condition for succession
to land."
The resulting diversity between the secular and ecclesiastical law
in force in England was of major significance because of the practice of
the secular courts of referring issues of legitimacy and marriage, when
they arose in certain actions, to the ecclesiastical courts for trial. Rights
of dower and succession were enforced by the secular courts but these
rights traditionally had depended upon the facts of valid marriage and
legitimacy-subjects beyond the competence of the secular courts. The
secular courts, therefore, would send a writ to the appropriate bishop
asking his decision on the issue of marriage or legitimacy and would
take his certificate as determinative for purposes of the secular case. But
once the new doctrines of marriage and legitimacy had been accepted by
the English Church, if the secular law was still to follow the traditional
English rules, this practice of referring such issues to ecclesiastical
courts for trial could hardly continue unchanged. In a dower dispute the
secular courts needed to know not merely whether the marriage was
lawful, but whether it had been performed publicly or in facie ecclesiae.
In the determination of heirship, the secular courts needed to know
specifically whether the asserted heir was born after the marriage of
his parents. Since the church courts were applying the classic Roman
canon law principles of consent de praesenti and legitimation per subsequens matrimonium, they no longer inquired into the precise questions
which the secular courts needed answered. The issue of concern to
15. See note 11 supra.
16. ENGDAHL, 15 Am. J. CoMp. L. 109, 128-30. See Y.B. Pasch. 10 H. 3, f.A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT Dower 201 (Tottelli ed. 1577).
17.

See ENGDAHL, 15 AM. J. COMp. L. 109, 128-30.
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the secular law and the issue resolvable by the church were no longer
the same.
Technicalities of Pleadingand the Bishop's Certificate
The thirteenth century jurists of England were perceptive enough
to note this distinction, and it accounts for two peculiarities of pleading
and procedure in the ancient Common Law. If, in an action concerning
heirship to land, a plea of general bastardy was made, that issue would
be sent to an ecclesiastical court for trial; but if the plea was that X is
a bastard because born before the marriage of his parents-the plea of
special bastardy-that issue would be tried by the country.'" If in an action
for dower unde nihil habet'9 one intended to impeach the validity
of the claimant's marriage to decedent, he would plead "ne unques
accouple en loyal matrimony"-never joined in lawful marriage 0-°and
that issue would be sent to an ecclesiastical court for trial; but if one
intended instead to question not the validity of the marriage but its
celebration in the face of the church he would plead simply "never
married"'" and that issue would be tried per pais.2 2
The distinction between pleas of general and special bastardy was
inaugurated after the Parliament at Merton in 1236. The distinction
between the pleas "never married" and "never joined in lawful marriage"
appears to have originated at the very beginning of the thirteenth
century. In November of the year 1200, Edith brought an action for
dower against Hugh before the King's Justices. 4 William, vouched to
warranty by Hugh, answered that Edith "was never married."2 5 Edith
replied that decedent had married her," and the Justices issued a writ to
18. BRACTON f. 416.
19. The term refers to the writ of a widow who had received no part of her dower.
See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 20-21 (3d ed. 1923) [hereinafter
cited as HOLDSWORTH].

20.

Y.B. Mich. 10 Rich. 2 f.- (1387), A. FITZHFmERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGETrial No. 100, reprinted at Trailles No. 6, Bel. 326, 72 Eng. Rep. 144 (1585);
Bac'roN f. 302. See also Ilderton v. Ilderton, 2 H. B1. 145, 126 Eng. Rep. 476 (C.P.
1793) ; Alien v. Grey, 1 Show. K.B. 50, 89 Eng. Rep. 441 (K.B. 1688), also reported at
2 Salk. 437, 91 Eng. Rep. 380, and Comb. 131, 90 Eng. Rep. 387.
21. One might also plead "she was never his wife." BRACTON f. 302.
22. Id. See also Mich. 9 & 10 Edw. 1, coram rege Rot. 24 Ebor. (1282), E.
MENT

FRIEDBERG,

WICKLUNG

DAS

RECHT

DER

52 (1865), 1 E.

EHESCHLIESSUNG

IN

SEINER

GEscHICHTLICHEN

COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAwS OF ENGLAND f.

ENT-

33a n.10

(18th ed. 1823). See also Betsworth and Betsworth, Sty. 10, 82 Eng. Rep. 490 (K.B.

1648). Per pais means by the country, i.e., by jury in the secular court.
23. See ENGDAHL, 15 Am. J. CoMp. L. 109, 126-27.
24. Mich. 2 John 1, 3 SELDEN SOCIETY PUBL., SELECT CIVIL PLEAS 6, pl. 15 (1200).
25. "Nunquam fuit desponsavat ....
".Id.
26.

"Ric [hard] earn desponsavat ....
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Lincoln to inquire "whether she was married or not." '
however, Agnes brought a similar suit against Philip. 8
answered she "was not married," 2 Agnes replied she
married,""0 and the question referred by the Justices to
the Bishop of Lincoln was, "whether she was lawfully married or not."$'
In the same term, Cecilia brought her dower claim before the Justices."3
In her case, on the objection that Cecilia "was not the wife" 3 of
decedent, the issue was sent to the Archbishop of York, who certified
that she "was lawfully married."8 The certificate evoked a discussion of
the novelty of the Bishop's law which is some evidence of the English
clergy's acceptance of the de praesenti principle around the year 1200."5
The reports do not disclose whether or not the judges in this case
decided to credit the ecclesiastical judgment to premise Cecilia's secular
right although based on novel canon law; a day was given for judgment
but the judgment does not appear. The cry had been raised, however,
that to judge one who, like Cecilia, had been espoused not at the church
door but on a sickbed, was "contrary to right and ecclesiastical custom. 3 8
Soon after, if not at that time, the secular courts began to decide for
themselves the issue of public celebration when that issue, rather than
canonical lawfulness, was raised. Thereafter the distinction between
those issues which were triable by the Bishop and those which were
triable per pais was vital, and the distinction in pleading between the
pleas "never married" and "never joined in lawful marriage" was its
mark.
The procedure of referring issues of marriage and legitimacy to
ecclesiastical courts for trial was employed only in proceedings in the
royal courts, never in the feudal courts, 8 and it was employed there
only in certain proprietary actions, never in possessory actions. The
9 tried only claims to seisin and not claims of
assize mort d'ancestor"
the Bishop of
A year later,
When Philip
"was lawfully

27. "Utrum desponsata fuit vel non . . . ." Id.
28. 3 John 1, 3 SELDEN SOCIETY PUBL., SELECT CIVIL PLEAS 39, pl. 92 (1201).
29. "Non fuit desponsata .... ." Id. at 40.
30. "Legitime desponsata fuit." Id.
31. "Uturn legitime desponsata fuit neene." Id.
32. 3 John 1, 3 SELDEN SOCIETY PUBL, SELECT CIVIL PLEAS 45, pl. 109 (1201).
33. "Non fuit sponsa .... ." Id.
34. "Legitime fuit desponsata." Id.
35. ENGDAHL, 15 AM. J. Comp. L. 109, 121.
si earn desponsavit earn
36. "Contra jus et consuetudinem ecclesiasticam: ...
desponsavit in lecto suo egitudinis." Y.B. 3 John 1, 3 SELDEN SOCIETY PUBL., SELECT
CIVIL PLEAS 45, pl. 109 (1201).
37. See ENGDAHL, 15 Am. J. CoMP. L. 109, 129-30.
38. No one but the King could demand that the bishop determine the issue. See
BRACTON ff. 106, 296.
39.

An assize of mort d'ancestor was a writ which lay for one whose ancestor died

seised of land in fee simple and after his death a stranger abated. See 3

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss1/1
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right. Glanvill records that in an assize mort d'ancestor the tenant could
40
stop the assize by asserting and proving the bastardy of the demandant,
but there is no suggestion that in this possessory action the issue of
bastardy was transferred to an ecclesiastical court for trial. Some manuscripts of Bracton report an assize mort d'ancestor in 1227 in which it
was the jury that found the claimants to have been born in adultery
before marriage. 4 ' Also, in other actions, issues of marriage and legitimacy were decided without reference to ecclesiastical courts. In some
actions, the secular court required only proof of repute of legitimacy or
marriage. 2 In other actions proof of actual performance of the traditional public ceremonials infacie ecclesiae seems to have been required,
and just as in the case of dower, even proof of espousals de praesenti
was insufficient if not in the face of the church. 8
From the thirteenth and throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, in all but proprietary actions, marriage in fact or in possession
or by reputation, all triable per pais, was sufficient to be proved; chal40.

R. GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIAE f.

47.

41. Henry Pamsore's or Panforer's Case, BRAc1roN f. 417. The fact that this case is
not given in the best manuscripts of Bracton has raised the inference that it is a later interpolation. In commenting on this case in his edition of BRACTON, Sir Travers Twiss
overlooked the distinction in practice between bastardy issues in possessory and proprietary actions. 6 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS El' CONSUETUDINIBUS 293 n.1 (T.Twiss ed.
1878). Regrettably, this writer followed him in this error in an earlier publication.
ENGDAHL, 15 AM. J. Comp. L. 109, 123.
42. E.g., Y.B. 22 Edw. 1 f.-(1294), 3 RERUm BRITANNICARUM MEuII AELvI
SCRPTOREs 426-29 (Horwood ed. reprint 1964) [hereinafter cited as HORWooD], noting
that when a woman confronted by her deed to bar an action of right pleads that she was
covert when she sealed the deed, it is sufficient if the defendant can aver that no one
knew the man was her husband and that he was not acknowledged as her husband.
A 1302 case indicated that reputation might sometimes be sufficient proof in
ecclesiastical courts to determine legitimacy when that issue was referred there by the
secular court. In proceedings on a writ of right de rationabili parte (see 3 HOLDSWORTH
22) the rights of adverse claimants to a fee depended on the legitimacy of a person then
deceased. The "inquisitio super bastardiam" was taken on the point whether decedent had
been regarded as a bastard during his lifetime. Y.B. 30 Edw. 1, f.-, 3 HORWOOD 286-91
(1302). Pollock and Maitland cited this case as an example of a secular court putting to
its own jurors a question of repute of bastardy. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 383 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND]. But
since the case arose on a writ of right and pertained to proprietary rights, the issue of
bastardy should have been decided by the ecclesiastical, not by the secular court. Since
Bracton uses the word "inquisitio" to designate the procedure of reference to the bishop
for trial, Pollock and Maitland's interpretation of "inquisitio" as if referring to secular
jurors in the 1302 case seems unsupportable.
43. See Del Heith's Case, De Banco Roll, Trin. 34 Edw. 1, f.- (1306) (assize of
novel disseisin), and Foxcote's Case, De Banco Roll, Pasch. 10 Edw. 1, f.-(1282)
(action of cosinage), both discussed in 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 383-84 and A.
FRIEDBERG, DAS REcHT DER EHESCHLIESSUNG IN SEINER GESCHICHTLICHVN ENTWICKLUNG 53-54 (1865). Pollock and Maitland somewhat miss the significance of these
cases, viewing them against their misapprehension of the early English requisites of a
valid marriage. See ENGDAHL, 15 Am.J. CoMp. L. 109, 114-21.
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lenges to the lawfullness of a marriage, a question for ecclesiastical
decision, were out of place." At the same time, the issue of the lawfulness of marriage continued to be raised in proprietary actions and
was referred to ecclesiastical courts for trial.45
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIEVAL FAITH AND CREDIT PRACTICE

The Hallmark of Thirteenth Century Conflicts Analysis
As the foregoing paragraphs demonstrate, there was a doctrine of
"full faith and credit" in English law not long after William the Conqueror separated the lay and ecclesiastical courts when the secular courts
began the practice of referring questions of marriage and legitimacy to
ecclesiastical courts for trial. While at first the secular court's countenance
might possibly have been confined to English ecclesiastical pronouncements specifically requested by the justices, by the middle of the thirteenth
century it is clear that even collateral prior decrees of English ecclesiastical courts would be credited in secular proceedings trying the right
to land. 6 English ecclesiastical courts, for their part, did not hesitate to
44. E.g., in 1338 plaintiff brought a writ of trespass against a woman and others,
and defendants moved to abate the writ on the ground that the woman defendant was
plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff sought to answer by pleading "never joined in lawful matrimony." This plea was not permitted, however, since the fact of the marriage, even if not
lawful, was deemed sufficient to abate the writ. Plaintiff was forced to plead instead that
she was not his wife, but since the proof showed he had married her, albeit under duress
and therefore unlawfully, the writ was abated. Y.B. Hil. 12 Edw. 3, f.-, 1 HORWOOD
360-63 (1338). Cf. Y.B. Hil. 12 Edw. 3, f.-, HORWOOD 390-93 (1338). Similarly, in
the assizes and in proceedings on writs of entry, see Y.B. Pasch. 49 Edw. 3, f. 18, pl. 11
(1376), and, when a marriage was contested in an appeal of felony for the rape of one's

wife, see Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen. 4, f. 13b, pl. 30 (1410). See generally Leigh and Hanmer's
Case, 1 Leo. 52, 74 Eng. Rep. 48 (C.P. 1587).

45. See Case LXXXIV, Jenk. 44, 145 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ex. 1366); Corbet's Case,
Y.B. Hil. 22 Edw. 4, f. 20, pl. 46 (1483), A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT Consultacion, f. 194, No. 5 (Tottelli ed. 1577), summarized at 7 Co. Rep. 44a-44b,
77 Eng. Rep. 477-78.
46. See William de Cardunville's Case, reported at 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 379-80.
Pollock and Maitland date the case "in or about 1254." Some short time previously

William had been divorced from Alice by church court decree because of his precontract
(pre-existing de praesenti marriage) with Joan who was still living. Both Joan and Alice
had borne sons to William, and at William's death Joan's son, age 24, and Alice's son,
age 4, both claimed as William's heir. The secular court proclaimed Joan's son heir.
Pollock and Maitland viewed this case as corroborating their view that
at this time our temporal courts were at one with our spiritual courts about
legitimacy and the capacity to inherit; that if the church said, 'This child is
legitimate,' the state said, 'It is capable of inheriting'; and that if the church
said, 'This child is illegitimate,' the state said, 'It is incapable of inheriting.'
Id. at 377. This writer has shown that view to be significantly mistaken. See ENGDAHL, 15
Am. J. CoMP. L. 109, 114-25. What William de Cardunville's Case rather shows is that
the secular courts, in proprietary proceedings wherein the procedure of reference to the
bishop would ordinarily be employed, would credit a prior collateral ecclesiastical determination of the same issue (whether or not the parties to both proceedings were the
same) and so avoid the need to bother the bishop over the same issue a second time.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss1/1

Engdahl: "Full Faith and Credit" in Merrie Olde England: New Insights for

1970]

"FULL FAITH AND CREDIT"

credit decrees of sister ecclesiastical courts and even of ecclesiastical
courts abroad. Bracton cites as relevant, in an ecclesiastical court
action to determine which claimant was the lawful wife, a divorce
celebrated "in the same kingdom or the same province or another."' 7
Far more surprising, however, is the fact that the English secular courts,
at least three and a half centuries before they finally came to credit the
judgments of any foreign secular courts,48 gave decrees of the church
courts abroad as much credit as was given to the church courts in
England. In one fourteenth century case, the court explained that "all
the courts Christian are one court.

49

The unquestioned certainity with which the court stated the rule
in that fourteenth century case suggests that it had been followed long
before. Indeed, alertness to it seems to have conditioned some of the
secular law's responses to the changes in canon law in the thirteenth
century. Bracton would not allow appeals from ecclesiastical proceedings
on an issue of bastardy referred from the secular courts to affect the
sufficiency of the original ecclesiastical decree for purposes of the secular
claim; to have regard for such appeals to higher ecclesiastical judges
outside the kingdom and ultimately to the pope would not only protract
the cause to infinity, he said, but would result in those foreigners taking
cognizance, if only indirectly, of an English lay fee.5" It was none of the
pope's business, in particular, Bracton argued, to dispose of temporal
matters.5 It must have been a consciousness that without such a rule

the already evident fact that the courts Christian were a single, integrated
judicial system would logically entail such a consequence which caused
Bracton to enunciate this rule. But however faithfully Bracton's rule
ignoring, for secular purposes, decisions on appeal from ecclesiastical
47.

BRACrON f. 94.

48. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
49. A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT Trial i No. 54, reprinted at
Trailles No. 1, Bel. 325, 72 Eng. Rep. 144 (1382). Thus if the ecclesiastical court of
Arches in England were to enter a judgment of privation and that judgment were to be
confirmed on appeal to the church tribunals at Rome, the Roman judgment would be
provable in the English secular court. Id. The rule was different with respect to a papal bull of privation, as distinguished from a judgment on appeal. See the 1398 case
reported at Id. Depriuationat Bel. 133, 72 Eng. Rep. 56; Id. Pape No. 2, at Bel. 257-58,
72 Eng. Rep. 112; Id. Quare impedit No 9, at Bel 283, 72 Eng. Rep. 124.
50. BRACTON ff. 307, 420.
51. Id. at f. 417b. R. GLANVILL, TRAcriBuS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUNIBUS REGNI
ANGLIE f. 29 admitted ecclesiastical court jurisdiction over lay fees in the single case of a
maritagium,the power of a lord of disposing of his infant ward in marriage. This exception has its roots in the period before the development of the ecclesiastical courts into an
independent and foreign-oriented system was complete.
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proceedings on questions referred from the secular courts might have
been applied in his own or later generations, papal or other foreign
ecclesiastical judgments must have determined rights in English land
when they had been previously rendered and were introduced for recognition in the English secular courts."
In the thirteenth century, however, the practice of crediting ecclesiastical decrees differed notably from the modern doctrine of full faith
and credit. For example, it was not necessary that the ecclesiastical
decree be "final""8 in order to receive credit. In the canon law, "non
transit sententia in rem judicatam contra matrimonium;' " but this
inherent non-finality of decrees affecting marriage did not deter the
secular courts from crediting such decrees. As Bracton's passage just
discussed indicates, the original Bishop's certificate, or in other cases the
most recent collateral decree, was conclusive for the secular purpose
without regard to subsequent church judgments, collateral or on appeal.
The thirteenth century practice also differed in that it pertained only to
secular recognition of ecclesiastical decrees concerning legitimacy and
marriage. The secular courts did not credit foreign secular decrees, and
there is no indication that ecclesiastical courts credited secular decrees.
English secular courts did recognize foreign ecclesiastical decrees because they viewed the Church in England and abroad as one."5
There is an even more significant difference, however, between
that ancient practice and modern doctrine. The most notable feature of
thirteenth century faith and credit practice reflected the distinction,
already mentioned above, which the jurists of that century drew between
the issues concerning legitimacy and marriage determinative of secular
proprietary rights and the issues determined by ecclesiastical courts
under the same name but according to new and different rules. As a
result of the conflicts which had emerged between the traditional English
law and the new law that the church courts in England now applied,
English secular courts had determined not to refer certain particular
issues in proprietary actions to the church courts for trial.5 6 Consistent
52.

See note 49 supra.

53. Cf. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183

(1901).

54. X. 2, 27, 7. "Sententia contra matritnon' nunquam transit in rem judicat'."
Kenn's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 42b, 43b, 77 Eng. Rep. 474, 476 (Ct. Wards 1607). The phrase
means that a judgment against the validity of a marriage never becomes res judicata.
55. See note 49 supra. Recognition of foreign ecclesiastical decrees by English
ecclesiastical courts was based on different principles since all those courts were part of

the same judicial system. As to judgments concerning marriage, of course, there was no
res judicata effect. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.

56. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
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with this determination, during the thirteenth century the secular courts
would refuse to accept a prior and collateral ecclesiastical adjudication
as determinative of one of those issues concerning which there was such
a conflict of laws.
This is illustrated by a case decided in the year 1282." B claimed
dower in lands which A, her deceased husband, had transferred to D.
The marraige between A and B had been held valid by the ecclesiastical
court in earlier proceedings brought there by B; however, this ecclesiastical decree confirming the marriage was not accepted as conclusive of
the dower right. While B was married in the eyes of the church, there
had been only a clandestine, de praesenti pact and that was insufficient
to entitle B to dower. The church court had found that B was "married,"
but the "marriage" required for dower involved an additional element
which the church court had not found. The secular court, therefore,
asked the further question, "was she duly endowed?" and found that
she was not because there was no formal celebration of the marriage
until after the land in question had been transferred. 8
Loss of the Thirteenth Century Analysis
The ability to distinguish between crediting an ecclesiastical judgment for what it had held and taking it for deciding more, a reflection
of the thirteenth century recognition that church and secular courts
expressed different notions of the same words, "legitimacy" and "marriage," was not to endure. Even in the 1282 case cited above, the court
of first instance had awarded B her dower, and it was only on recourse
to the King's Court and Council that the distinction between the two
issues was made. " At the Common Pleas in 1305 the judges' loss of
this important distinction was manifest.6" Alice brought an action for
dower against R who defended by saying the decedent grantor had never
married Alice. Alice's attorneys replied that this amounted to saying she
57. Mich. 9 & 10 Edw. 1, coram rege Rot. 24 Ebor. (1282), 1 E. COKE, INsnTuTTs
OF THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 33a n.10 (18th ed. 1823), E. FRIEDBERG, DAS RECHT DER

EHESCHLIESSUNG IN SEINER GESCHICHTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG 52 (1865).
As Coke
states the case:
A. contracts per verba de praesenti with B. and had issue by her; and afterwards marries C. in facie ecclesiae. B. recovers A. for her husband by sentence
of the Ordinary, and for not performing the sentence he is excommunicated, and
then marries B. in facie ecclesiae and dies. She brings dower against D. and
recovers because the feoffment was per fraudem between the sentence and the
sollemn marriage, sed reversatur coram rege et concilio, quia praedictus A.
non fuit seisitus during the espousals between him and B.

Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Y.B. Mich. 33 Edw. 1, f.-, 5 HoRwooD 64 (1305).
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was never joined to him in lawful matrimony and that this claim could
not be raised because in a previous dower action by Alice against one
William, he had pleaded to the lawfulness of the marriage and the issue had
been sent to the Bishop. The Bishop's disposition of the issue in that proceeding, it was argued, must be credited in the present action since one
"ought not send twice to the Bishop." R's attorneys, however, explained
that they did not deny the canonical lawfulness of the marriage, but only
denied that she had been married in the face of the church.
We are not pleading as William pleaded; we do not speak of
not being joined &c; but we say that he never married her;
of which the country may well have cognisance and it may
be tried in this Court."l
If there had been no prior ecclesiastical decree, certainly the distinction pleading "ne unques accouple en loyal matrimony" and pleading
"never married" would have been crucial, for only the former would
invoke the procedure of reference to the ecclesiastical court for trial. 2 In
the 1282 case,6 " even a prior ecclesiastical decree was disregarded
when the issue involved in the secular action was that raised by the plea
of "never married." In 1305, however, the court failed to understand the
distinction. To the claim that the plea "never married" (i.e., not espoused
in facie ecclesiae) could be tried in the secular court notwithstanding
the prior ecclesiastical adjudication of a different question (whether
lawfully married by canonical standards) Judge Hengham replied, "Certainly it can not; any more than that she was joined &c." On the
strength of the prior church judgment, Alice won the case.64
It was this less perceptive principle of credit to ecclesiastical judgments which became established in the fourteenth century. In 1366, a
plea of general bastardy was entered in a proprietary real action. 5 In
accordance with the traditional practice, this issue was sent to the
Bishop. When the Bishop made his return he not only certified the
claimant to be a bastard, but also revealed the basis of his finding-that
the claimant had been begotten during his mother's elopement with an
adulterer. This was sufficient to make him a bastard by the Roman
canon law but not by the traditional English law. Nevertheless, the
61.

Id. at 64-66.

62.
63.

See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
64. Y.B. Mich. 33 Edw. 1, f.-, 5 HORWOOD 64 (1305).
65. Case LXXXIV, Jenk. 44, 145 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ex. 1366). See also Corbet's Case,
Y.B. Hil. 22 Edw. 4, f. 20, pl. 46 (1483), A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT Consultacion, f. 194, No. 5 (Tottelli ed. 1577), summarized in 7 Co. Rep. 44a-44b,
77 Eng. Rep. 477-78.
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secular court resolved upon the bishop's certificate that the claimant was
a bastard, and the report declares:
Where the Cognizance of a Cause belongs to the Spiritual
Courts, and they give Sentence in it, and express the Cause
of their Sentence, although this Cause of their Sentence be null
and void in our Law; yet our Law approves the Sentence. 8
The hallmark of the thirteenth century conflicts analysis had been
the ability of the English jurists to penetrate the form of words to
discover conflicting meanings, with the result that an ecclesiastical finding of "marriage" or "bastardy" would not necessarily determine a
dower or succession right."7 Had it employed this analysis, the court in
this 1366 case could have penetrated the term "bastard" and concluded
that while they both went under the same name, what was found by the
ecclesiastical court and what was contemplated by the secular law of
succession were not actually the same. Accordingly, even assuming full
loyalty to the tradition of according faith and credit, the ecclesiastical
decree would not have been controlling because the question raised in
the secular proceeding was not actually the same as that which had been
answered by the bishop. The courts, however, had forgotten this technique of analysis. As a result, more than full faith and credit was given
to the ecclesiastical decree. All the bishop could determine was that the
claimant was a bastard by the canon law. Secular rights of property,
however, depended upon legitimacy under the traditional English rules.
By default in analysis, by heeding only the form and disregarding the
meaning of the word, the ecclesiastical decree was given quite a different
effect in the secular court than it had in the court where rendered.
The thirteenth century conflicts analysis had been lost to memory.
Eventually, the requirement of endowment in the presence of the church
died away, and "dower in facie ecclesiae" became merely a matter of
historical importance, 8 and even then without recall of its original
significance. The distinction between general and special bastardy remained in use somewhat longer but with no greater understanding of its
origins or original significance. While procedural distinctions between
issues to be tried by the bishop and those to be tried per pais (if not
previously adjudicated) persisted, the reasons for these distinctions (and
the implications those reasons entailed) were lost. Substantial differences
in meaning were left hidden behind the identity of mere words.
66. Jenk. at 44, 145 Eng. Rep. at 33 (emphasis in original).
67. See ENGDAHL, 15 AM. J. CoMP. L. 109, 125-30.
68. See [Anonymous], TREATISE ON FEME COVERTS 62-63 (1732).
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FAITH AND CREDIT PRACTICE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Through the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century
the practice of referring issues of lawful marriage arising in proprietary
actions to ecclesiastical courts continued, 9 although with some exceptions."' As for centuries before, in all other proceedings the lawfulness
of a marriage was of no concern; only marriage in fact, marriage in
possession or marriage in reputation was required."' However, as has
already been noted, during the fourteenth century English secular courts
began to accept ecclesiastical judgments on issues of legitimacy and
marriage as dispositive of those issues in the secular courts even in
circumstances where their thirteenth century predecessors would have
recognized that the issues raised in the secular courts differed from those
decided by the church courts."2 This continued to be true.73 Moreover,
prior ecclesiastical decrees came to be taken as dispositive of issues
concerning marriage even in non-proprietary actions, where, but for the
accident of prior litigation, the church's view of the issue would have
been irrelevant. While the procedure of reference to the Bishop still was
not used in such cases 4 because the lawfulness of marriage was not the
issue, the secular courts began to credit a prior ecclesiastical decree to
settle issues of marriage and legitimacy in such non-proprietary actions.
Evidence of this development does not appear until the sixteenth
century. The thirteenth and fourteenth century cases discussed above
which show the loss of the thirteenth century distinction between the
69. See Wickham v. Enfield, Cro. Car. 351, 79 Eng. Rep. 908 (K.B. 1633); Kenn's
Case, Jenk. 289, 145 Eng. Rep. 209 (Ex. 1610). The court in Betsworth and Betrzworth,
Sty. 10, 82 Eng. Rep. 490 (K.B. 1648), asserted that "wife or not wife is triable at the
common law; but whether lawfully married or not, is triable in the Spiritual Court." Id.
70. E.g., in 1566 the Judges of Common Pleas advised that where the alleged bastard
was not a party to the action, the bastardy would be tried per pais. Simond's Case, 3 Leo.
11, 74 Eng. Rep. 508 (C.P. 1566). Simond's Case, however, was an action of formedon,
originally a possessory action in which the procedure of reference to the church courts
would not have been employed in any event. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
Holdsworth notes, however, that
[tihe writ of Formedon (forma doni), though originally regarded as being
possessory in character, came to be regarded as so distinctly proprietary that it
was called the writ of right for the tenant in tail.
3 HOLDSWORTH 17. It may be, therefore, that by the mid-sixteenth century the referral
procedure was being employed in formedon as in the older proprietary actions.
71. Leigh and Hanmer's Case, 1 Leo. 52, 74 Eng. Rep. 48 (C.P. 1587) ; Fletcher v.
Pynfett, Cro. Jac. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 88 (K.B. 1605); Fulwood's Case, Cro. Car. 488,
493, 79 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1026 (K.B. 1638). Cf. Ambrosia Gorge's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 22a, 77
Eng. Rep. 286 (Ct. Wards 1599) ; Porter's Case, Cro. Car. 461, 79 Eng. Rep. 1000 (K.B.
1637); Williams' Case, March N.R. 101, 82 Eng. Rep. 430 (K.B. 1642); Middleton's
Case, Kel. J. 27, 84 Eng. Rep. 1066 (K.B. 1662).
72. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Wickham v. Enfield, Cro. Car. 351, 79 Eng. Rep. 908 (K.B. 1633).
74. But see note 70 supra.
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issues decided in ecclesiastical courts and those raised in secular courts
all involved claims of proprietary right to land."5 In a 1483 decision,
the court observed that if the parents of claiming heirs had been unjustly
divorced, the heirs should sue to avoid the divorce in the ecclesiastical
court, "for so long as the divorce stood in force (the common law gives
so great credit to it) the issue could not have remedy by the common
law."7 This dictum was offered in connection with a hypothetical which
supposed the heirs to be interested in protecting their proprietary right.
In the sixteenth century, however, the secular courts began to credit
ecclesiastical judgments even when they were introduced in actions not
concerning proprietary rights in land.
In 1537 the Common Pleas faced the question whether, when a
woman brings certain goods with her to a marriage and is afterwards
divorced, she should have those goods back." It was suggested that the
divorce might have been procured by perjured testimony in the ecclesiastical court. Shelley replied:
Yet if they of the spiritual court give judgment in any case,
be it true or false, until it be reversed and defeated, it shall
bind all the world; as in our law a recovery upon a false oath
binds until it be defeated by attaint. 8
About 1560 the Common Pleas, over the protests of the Chancellor,
credited an ecclesiastical decree of divorce in another sort of action."'
Wilmott had married Henry and then procured a divorce on the ground
of his impotence. She soon after married Cary, and, desirous of securing
her lands to him, they levied a fine on her lands as husband and wife.
But Henry had also remarried and, it was alleged, had begotten a child.
It was argued that the fine should not be engrossed to Cary and Wilmott
as husband and wife because the prior divorce was avoided and they
were not married. The doctors of the civil law consulted by the court
declared that Henry's demonstrated virility showed the divorce to have
been procured by fraud, and "because the holy church was deceived in
its former judgment,""0 that judgment should be treated as of no effect.
But regarding the church decree as still in force and determinative, the
75. See notes 59-68 supra and accompanying text.
76. Corbet's Case, Y.B. Hil. 22 Edw. 4, f. 20, pl. 46 (1483), A. FITZHEREERT, LA
GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT Cons1ltacion, f. 194, No. 5 (Tottelli ed. 1577), summarized in 7
Co. Rep. 44a-44b, 77 Eng. Rep. 477-78.
77. Reported at 1 Dy. 13a, 73 Eng. Rep. 28 (C.P. 1538).
78. Id., 73 Eng. Rep. at 29.
79. Bury's Case, 2 Dy. 179a, 73 Eng. Rep. 394 (C.P. 1560). The case is discussed by
counsel in Morris & Webber's Case, 2 Leo. 169, 74 Eng. Rep. 449 (C.P. 1587).
80. 2 Dy. at 179a, 73 Eng. Rep. at 394.
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court ordered the fine to be engrossed.
Twenty-five years or so later, the same decree of divorce between
Henry and Wilmott came into dispute again. " Henry was seised and
made a feoffment to a friend to the use of himself for life, remainder for
life to the use of such woman as he should marry, remainder in tail to the
first-born of his body lawfully begotten by such woman, remainder in fee
to his own lawful heirs.8 2 Then having been divorced from Wilmott as
already discussed, Henry married Phillippa. During this marriage,
Phillippa gave birth to Humphrey. After Henry and Phillippa died
Humphrey entered and gave a lease to Morris for a term of years.
Webber, claiming under the brother of Henry (the brother apparently
claimed as Henry's heir) ejected Morris. Morris in 1587 brought an
action ejectione firmae against Webber. Morris' claim depended, under
the terms of the feoffment, upon the legitimacy of his lessor, Humphrey,
which depended upon his parents' marriage, which in turn depended
upon Henry's divorce from his first wife, Wilmott. The case was
argued, adjourned and argued again repeatedly until finally at Michaelmas term judgment was entered for Morris, the plaintiff.88 Defendant
had urged that if Henry were in fact impotent, Humphrey must be a
bastard, and that if Henry were not in fact impotent, his divorce from
Wilmott was null, his marriage to Phillippa thus void and poor Humphrey a bastard still. The court, however, would not relitigate the ground
of the divorce but would give it effect until repealed by the ecclesiastical
court.8 4 The marriage to Phillippa then was not impeached, and the
81. Morris v. Webber, Moo. K.B. 225, 72 Eng. Rep. 545 (C.P. 1587), also reported at 2 Leo. 169, 74 Eng. Rep. 449. Less complete reports appear at 1 And. 185, 123 Eng.
Rep. 421, and sub nom. Bury's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 98b, 77 Eng. Rep. 207.
82. John [Henry] Bury fist feofment . . . al use luy mulier pur vie, remainder
pur vie al use de tiel feme quel is apres mariera, remainder en tail al primer
fits de son corps sur tiel feme loyalment engenders, remainder en fee a ses droit
heirs demesne.
Moo. K.B. at 225, 72 Eng. Rep. at 545. (Whom we have called Henry, this report calls
John.) The account of the feoffment given in 2 Leo. at 169, 74 Eng. Rep. at 449-50, is
Humphry made a
different and seems to make no sense: "Hen. Bury was seised ....
feoffment in fee unto the use of himself for life, and after to the use of the first, or eldest
son of the body of the said Henry in tail."
83. 2 Leo. at 173, 74 Eng. Rep. at 453; Moo. K.B. at 228, 72 Eng. Rep. at 547.
84. The report says:
Term. Mich. Anno 30 & 31 Eliz. fuit adjudge que les issues ne fuerant bastards,
quia le divorce ne fuit adnul per sentence declaratory del Eglise en les vies les
Et n notre ley ne fuit de inquirer le cause del divorce, mes de
parties ....
ponder le sentence pur bone tanq repeal.
Moo. K.B. at 228, 72 Eng. Rep. at 547. Counsel for Morris had conceded in argument
that in some cases such credit would not be given the ecclesiastical decree:
[A]s if a man bringeth an action, de muliere abducta cum bonis viri, where after
the trespass committed, the husband and wife are divorced, yet the action lieth,
for this action is not in the right, but in possession onely, and in such action,
never accoupled in legal matrimony, is not any plea, but the defendant ought to
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common law presumption of the legitimacy of children born during
coverture applied. In 1597 or 1598 the same case, or another involving
the same land (which is not clear"5), was taken up on a writ of error,
and the judgment based on crediting the divorce was affirmed. 8
Another example from the same period is the case of Bunting v.
Lepingwell, 7 decided in the King's Bench in 1585. John Bunting had
entered into a de praesenti marriage with Agnes, but later Agnes married
Twede and cohabited with him. John then sued Agnes in an ecclesiastical
court and proved his de praesenti contract. The ecclesiastical court did
not pronounce a divorce between Agnes and Twede; Twede was not even
a party. Rather, it simply decreed that John and Agnes were married by
the prior de praesenti pact and should therefore solemnize their union and
live together. John and Agnes obeyed this decree, and afterwards Charles
Bunting was born to them. Charles' legitimacy was put in question as
affecting his claim to copyhold lands-a possessory, not a proprietary
claim. Charles' legitimacy, of course, depended upon the marriage of his
parents while Twede remained still living and undivorced. The Court
held the issue determined by the ecclesiastical decree:
[F]orasmuch as the conusance of the right of marriage
belongs to the Ecclesiastical Court, and the same Court has
given sentence in this case, the Judges of our law ought
(although it be against the reason of our law) to give faith
and credit to their proceedings and sentences ....
"
answer to the possession, not his wife; for although they are divorced, yet the
action lieth ....
2 Leo. at 170, 74 Eng. Rep. at 450. This argument might indicate what had been true many
decades before; however, "never accoupled in legal matrimony" had never been a fit plea
in actions concerning the goods of a divorced wife, 1 Dy. 13a, 73 Eng. Rep. 28 (C.P.
1538) ; nor in proceedings to engross a fine, Bury's Case, 2 Dy. 179a, 73 Eng. Rep. 394
(C.P. 1560) ; nor in actions ejectione firmae, Morris v. Webber, 2 Leo. 169, 74 Eng. Rep.
449 (C.P. 1587) ; nor in copyhold cases, Bunting v. Lepingwell, 4 Co. Rep. 29a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 950 (K.B. 1585), and yet in all of these pleas, ecclesiastical decrees were now receiving credit.
85. Moore reports this as an ejectione firmae by Webber against one Berry, perhaps Bury. Moo. K.B. at 228, 72 Eng. Rep. at 547. This could have been Humphrey Bury
who might have ejected Webber if the latter entered on the expiration of Morris' term.
But the other reports either treat the writ of error as being taken in Morris & Webber's
Case (2 Leo. at 173, 74 Eng. Rep. at 453; 5 Co. Rep. 98b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 208) or else
say nothing to settle the point (Jenk. 268, 145 Eng. Rep. 193).
86. Bury's Case, Jenk. at 268, 145 Eng. Rep. at 193; Moo. K.B. at 228, 72 Eng.
Rep. at 547; 2 Leo. at 173, 74 Eng. Rep. at 453; 5 Co. Rep. at 98b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 208.
87. 4 Co. Rep. 29a, 76 Eng. Rep. 950 (K.B. 1585).
88. Id., 76 Eng. Rep. at 952. The justices had asked for and received the opinion of
one Goldingham, Doctor of the Civil Law, on the question of Charles' legitimacy in view
of the prior proceedings. Goldingham's opinion is reported at Moo. K.B. 169, 72 Eng. Rep.
510.
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In 1607 Martha exhibited a bill in the Court of Wards against Sir
N. Stallenge to traverse his office as custodian of a ward claimed as heir
to a certain manor." Simplified, the facts showed that Christopher
Kenn was seised of a manor in knights service in capite (of the King)
and in 1546 married Elizabeth Stowell by whom he begat Martha.
Several years later Christopher and Elizabeth were divorced by ecclesiastical decree and Christopher married Elizabeth Beckwith. In 1562 the
second wife, Elizabeth, brought proceedings in an ecclesiastical court to
which both Christopher and his first wife Elizabeth were made parties.
This ecclesiastical proceeding terminated with a decree confirming that
Christopher had never lawfully married the first wife and was lawfully
married to the second, Elizabeth Beckwith." Elizabeth Beckwith died
and Christopher married Florence and had a daughter, whom the
report calls simply "E." Christopher died while E was still an infant,
and Queen Elizabeth granted her wardship and custody to Stallenge.
Martha, claiming to be heir of Christopher, brought this action to
traverse the office of Stallenge. Martha's case was that the divorce
between Christopher and her mother, Elizabeth Stowell, was based on
their supposed nonage but that she could prove they in fact were of age.
The age of consent, Martha argued, was triable at the common law,
and since her claim (though not formally raised in a proprietary real
action) concerned the true descent of a manor, and particularly since
sentences against marriage never become res judicata,9" she should be
permitted to impeach the divorce decree in this secular proceeding. But,
after some delays occasioned by the deaths of parties and revivals of the
action, the court refused to permit her attack:
[W]e will never examine the cause, whether it be true or not;
for of things (the cognizance whereof belongs to the Ecclesiastical Court), we ought to give credit to their sentences, as
they give to the judgments in our Courts. 2
DISPLACEMENT OF THE INDIGENOUS FAITH AND CREDIT DOCTRINE

English Acceptance of the InternationalLaw Rules
The tradition of faith and credit to ecclesiastical decrees as it
developed in English secular courts into the sixteenth century was of
native English stock. So far as it respected judgments of English
89.
289, 145
90.
91.
92.

Kenn's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 42b, 77 Eng. Rep. 474 (Ct. Wards 1607), aff'd, Jenk.
Eng. Rep. 209 (Ex. 1610).
Id. at 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 475.
See note 54 supra.
7 Co. Rep. at 43b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 476.
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ecclesiastical courts, its roots extended as far as the eleventh century
when the Conqueror separated the lay and ecclesiastical courts after
which the practice of referring issues of marriage and legitimacy arising
in proprietary proceedings to ecclesiastical courts for trial arose.9" So
far as it respected judgments of ecclesiastical courts abroad, it rested on
the recognition that all the courts of the Catholic Church were part of
the same unified judiciary so that no distinction should be drawn
between ecclesiastical courts in England and abroad."4 Although to this
point the English faith and credit doctrine was indigenous, the doctrine
of faith and credit as it developed in succeeding generations had other
and foreign sources.
After the Reformation of the sixteenth century the unity of all the
courts Christian was manifestly destroyed. England's church courts in
particular were no longer a part of the Catholic judicial system. 5 The
courts in England recognized that the old justification for crediting the
judgments of foreign ecclesiastical courts was thus removed. In a case at
Common Pleas in 1585"6 Justice Rodes raised the old point of the
unity of ecclesiastical courts, citing fourteenth century precedent.9" Rejecting that principle, however, the court held that letters of administration granted by a bishop in Ireland would not be credited in England."8
The old justification for crediting foreign ecclesiastical judgments
has scarcely disappeared, however, when new principles requiring credit
to foreign judgments, secular as well as ecclesiastical, were received.
The international situation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
made it necessary for the English and for English law to take account
of happenings abroad to a degree much greater than before.9 Because of
the very insularity on which the English traditionally had prided themselves, their Common Law was ill-suited to serve them in matters of
international scale. The government itself recognized the necessity for
men trained in the civil law to do the king's service not only because
other states' internal systems must to some degree be understood, but
also because England herself in dealing internationally must live by the
civilian's rules.' 0 As England opened its legal mind to the rules of the
93.

ENGDAHL, 15 Am. J. CoMP. L. 109, 111.
94. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
95. See ENGDAHL, 16 KAN. L. REv. 505, 511.
96. Carter & Crost's Case, Godb. 33, 78 Eng. Rep. 21 (C.P. 1585).
97. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
98. Godb. at 33, 78 Eng. Rep. at 21.
99. See 4 HOLDSWORTH 228-39.

100. Id. at 232-33. The English referred to the civilians for the law of treaties,
martial causes and diplomatic protocol. See 1 T. RIDLEY, A VIEW OF THE CIVILE AND
ECcLESIASTICALL LAW 6-12 (3d ed. 1639).
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civilians, the recognition of foreign judgments came to be admitted as
an obligation under international law. These new principles seem to have
been admitted at about the turn of the seventeenth century. The first
reported case explicitly referring to crediting a foreign secular decree
was decided in 1607.1' While the native English faith and credit
principles pertained to secular recognition of ecclesiastical decrees, these
new principles were sufficiently general
to oblige the ecclesiastical
courts likewise to credit secular decrees. 2 The same principles were used
to urge the English ecclesiastical courts (though no longer a part of the
Catholic judicial system) to credit the judgments of ecclesiastical courts
abroad.'
Of course, the English secular courts continued, under the
new principles, to credit English ecclesiastical decrees ;...in fact, while
the older cases which this writer has discovered deal only with ecclesiastical decrees respecting legitimacy and marriage, in the seventeenth
century credit began to be given to church court judgments on other
matters as well.'
This new faith and'credit practice began early to
exhibit some of the characteristics typical of modern faith and credit
practices.'
The InternationalLaw Rules and the Universality of Marriage
The international law rules of faith and credit, insofar as they
101.

Wier's Case, 1 H. ROLLE, ABRIDGMENT 530 (1668) and 2 K. D'ANVaR,
265 (2d ed. 1722). It was there stated that foreign judgments should be
enforced in the admiralty courts because their recognition was enjoined by international
law, a branch of the civil law, and the admiralty court alone "hath the execution of the
Civil Law within the realm." Id. See Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the
English Law, in 3 LAw, A CENTURY OF PROGRESs 342, 382 (1937).
102. Webb v. Cook, Cro. Jac. 535, 626, 79 Eng. Rep. 459, 538 (K.B. 1622, 1624), is the
first instance the author has found of enforcement of a requirement of faith and credit
upon the ecclesiastical courts. But in Kenn's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 42b, 77 Eng. Rep. 474 (Ct.
Wards 1607), the Common Pleas assumed that ecclesiastical courts would credit secular
court judgments just as the secular courts credited ecclesiastical judgments.
103. See Cottington's Case, 2 Swans. 326, 36 Eng. Rep. 640 (Ch. 1678).
104. E.g., Dacosta v. Villa Real, 2 Str. 961, 93 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1734).
105. E.g., Needham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 135a, 77 Eng. Rep. 678 (C.P. 1611) ; Caudrey's Case, 5 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1595).
106. The indigenous English practice did not require a judgment to be final in
order to receive faith and credit. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. In contrast,
Jurado v. Gregory, 2 Keb. 511, 84 Eng. Rep. 320 (K.B. 1669), denied faith and credit to
a Spanish judgment which was interlocutory and therefore as yet "imperfect."
In Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show. K.B. 232, 89 Eng. Rep. 907 (1692), an action of
trover for a ship and goods, defendant pleaded a judgment in his favor in the admiralty
court of France. The court
adjudged, that as we are to take notice of a sentence in the Admiralty here, so
ABRIDGMENT

ought we of those abroad in other nations ....

It is but agreeable with the law

of nations that we should take notice and approve of the laws of their countries
in such particulars.
Id., 89 Eng. Rep. at 908. See also Beak v. Tyrell, Carth. 31, 90 Eng. Rep. 623 (Adm.
1688) ; Grove's Case, 2 Vent. 41, 86 Eng. Rep. 296 (C.P. 1682).
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relate to marriage, developed in a context notably different from thirteenth century England. Consequently, the distinction between the issue
concerning marriage which is at stake in the forum and that which might
have been resolved by the court of another system..7 has never been
recognized by those rules. The old English distinction grew out of the
conflict between the rules of two competing systems-the traditional
English and the novel Roman canon laws-regarding legitimacy and
marriage." 8 The international law rules, on the other hand, developed on
the Continent after the Church had consolidated its power and the laws
concerning legitimacy and marriage were uniform and everywhere received.' Marriage in that era was everywhere in Western Christendom the same. Moreover, this notion of universality was reinforced by
the metaphysical reification of marriage;11

if a marriage did in fact

exist, how could any court deny it? The ecclesiastical courts were to
determine the existence of the res, and until years after the start of the
Reformation, no European secular court would presume to contest
their decision.
It was not until well into the seventeenth century that the principal
secular powers on the Continent began to legislate on the validity of
marriage,"' putting an end to the uniformity of European marriage law
which had prevailed with few, late and relatively minor exceptions,"'
for more than four hundred years. From that time on, the requisites of
a valid marriage in France or in the Empire were different from the
requisites in Holland or in England, and any or all might vary from
the requisites of the canon law. Once the forces loosed by the Reformation had thus shattered the Catholic uniformity of marriage law,
it was no longer accurate to say that marriage was everywhere, even
in western Christendom, the same.
While today, with a telescoped view of history, one rhight view the
medieval uniformity of marriage law as shattered, to contemporaries the
changes were gradual and very subtle. Established habits of thinking
were not easily overcome. Europe still retained a common social or
107. See notes 13-37 supra and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. E.g., if the, laws of the Empire or the customs in France conditioned secular
rights upon marriage, what they conceived of as marriage was exactly the same-a
marriage according to the classic Roman canon law. See ENGDAHL, 15 NEDERLANDS 42.
110. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. For a more detailed account, see
ENGDAHL, 8 J. FAm. L. 381.
111. ENGDAHL, 15 NEDERLANDS 42, 45-46, 64-65.
112. The exceptions included England during the reign of Henry VIII, Geneva
under the influence of Calvin and the rebelling protestant United Provinces of the Netherlands. See ENGDAHL, 15 NEDERLANDS 42, 53-55; ENGDAHL, 16 KAN. L. Ray. 505, 508-18.
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cultural concept of marriage, and the new legal diversity was easily
overlooked. The choice of law rules which French and German secular
jurists developed for marriage preserved the principle of universality
inherent in their canonical models ;11 likewise, the rules governing recognition of foreign judgments concerning marriage failed to recognize
the new legal diversity between marriage in different systems. The
question was never asked whether the "marriage" proved by the foreign
judgment was such a "marriage" as was required by the forum law
being applied. In the Netherlands, Ulrich Huber propounded a different
conflicts doctrine which did mark the difference between forum and
foreign "marriage,""' but even though the English derived much of their
conflicts doctrine from the Dutch, they either could not understand or
else could not accept such a Balkanization of marriage. Failing to
recognize, as their thirteenth century ancestors had, that the one term
"marriage" can mean different things, they established the modern
practice regarding recognition of judgments concerning marriage.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIGENOUS ENGLISH
FAITH AND CREDIT PRACTICE

HistoricalResearch and Conceptual Analysis
Until now, scholars have believed that the English were not concerned with the conflict of laws until the start of the seventeenth century.
The research discussed in the foregoing pages, however, discloses an
indigenous faith and credit practice which flourished in England for
centuries before that time. An indigenous choice of law practice can
also be identified, even before the time of Bracton."' The objective
of this writer's research, however, is not merely historical enlightenment; it is the improvement of conflict of laws doctrine.
Because the international law rules of faith and credit as they apply
to marriage, and the modern practice based upon those rules, presume
the universality of marriage, they are clearly inept for dealing with cases
where "marriage" is used with a different meaning in each of the
systems concerned. While apologists for the traditional rules are prone
to disparage the fact, marriage as a legal concept, as distinguished from
a social concept, has not been universal for well over two hundred years.
113. After the Council of Trent's reforms, confirmed
uniformity was broken by the Church's own marriage
developed choice of law rules to reconcile its own divergent
15 NEDERLANDS 42, 48-53. These were the prototypes of
developed by secular conflicts jurists.

114. Id. at 60-63.
115. See ENGDAHL, 15 AM. J.CoMP. L. 109.
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by the Pope in January, 1564,
rules. The Church, however,
marriage rules. See ENGDAHL,
the conflicts rules later to be
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The native English faith and credit practice offers the prototype for an
appropriate faith and credit analysis for today. That ancient practice,
long ago forgotten by judges and lawyers and overlooked even by legal
historians, flourished in an era when jurists were acutely aware of the
different meanings attached to identical words by separate but interrelating systems of law. The same divergence in the meaning of common
terms exists on a far greater scale today-although, amazingly, this
seemingly obvious fact has escaped the notice of all the notables of
jurisprudence who have wrestled with the concept of "status" over the
course of the last century and more.11

A modern doctrine of full faith and credit can be built upon this
ancient foundation. This can be done consistently with the American full
faith and credit clause, and, at least in America and England, it can
be done by courts themselves without legislative action . 7 Such a "new"
faith and credit doctrine would facilitate the effectuation of deeply felt
policies which courts otherwise, hamstrung by traditional conceptual
errors, must strain to effectuate by compromise doctrines or fail to
effectuate at all."' To those who incline toward an easy jurisprudence,
blundering down the path pointed out by any handy precedent, the
foregoing discussion and this writer's other efforts might seem tedious,
superfluous and obscure. Conceptual errors sanctified by the endorsement
of generations are not easily dislodged. Still the effort must be made, for
however tedious the pathway might seem, it is the path that juristic
opinion must travel if it is to escape its conceptualist entrapment and
respond, as law ought to respond, to the social and humane factors at
stake in marriage conflicts and faith and credit cases.
A Proposal Applying the Indigenous English Practice to Modern
MarriageConflicts Law
Such a faith and credit doctrine can be summarily sketched here."'
116. E.g., John Austin, Sir Thomas Holland, A. V. Dicey and Carleton Kemp Allen.
The writer has reviewed and criticized their concepts of status. See ENGDAHL, 55 IOWA L.
REV. 56, 57-72. The principle error is the failure to recognize the fact that the "universality" of marriage is a chimera. Id. at 106-08.
117. The United States Constitution provides that "[flull Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
118. A typical question facing the courts is whether to award workmen's compensation benefits to a woman with whom the deceased had been living for many years but
without being "lawfully" married.
119. The proposed faith and credit doctrine was originally included in more detailed
form in another law review article. See ENGDAHL, 55 IOWA L. REv. 56, 111-14. The proposal is outlined in the present article at the request of this Review to insure a more
integrated manuscript.
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The insight which the ancient practice provides is the recognition that
the "status" which is conferred by the law of one jurisdiction and the
"status" upon which certain rights are conferred by the law of another
jurisdiction may not be the same though both are designated by the
same verbal label. Specifically, to use the thirteenth century example,
fulfilling certain requisites may make a woman a "wife" by canon law,
and by the Common Law a "wife" is entitled to dower; but what the
church courts had in mind when they adjudged someone a "wife" was very
different from what the Common Law had in mind as a "wife" who was
entitled to dower. The principle is applicable to modern conflicts questions, and indeed even to questions involving only the laws of a single
state. It is simply erroneous to collect all the rights attributed to "marriage" and regard them as a single status because the classes of persons
upon which these several rights are conferred are not the same. Consequently, a divorce in State A does not determine that the parties are
not married, but only that the parties are not married for certain
purposes. Moreover, unless it is to be pretended that State A has power
to give its judgments by their own force extraterritorial effect, all the
State A judgment really says is that the parties are not married for
certain purposes in A. Thus, the judgment in A says nothing of the
marriage for any purpose outside of A.
The basic principle of recognition of foreign judgments imposed on
American state courts by the full faith and credit clause is said to be
that the judgment of one state must be given the same effect in another
state as it has in the state where it was rendered.12 On this analysis,
however, the judgment of State A affects only rights in A; indeed, A
would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in State B. For B to
give the A judgment any effect for any purpose in B is to give it greater
effect than the judgment has in A. It is apparent, therefore, that what
the full faith and credit clause actually is taken to mean is not that the
A judgment must be given in B the same effect which it has in A; rather,
B must afford rights in B equivalent to those that the A judgment
affords in A. Moreover, "the full faith and credit clause is not an
inexorable and unqualified command."12 ' There is some room left for
B's local policy to interpose and refuse to afford rights equivalent to
those afforded by the A judgment in A.
To make the illustration more concrete, suppose that a judgment in
State A had determined that X was entitled to payments of support from
Y as Y's wife. That judgment could not be taken under the full faith
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964).
121.

Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941).
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and credit clause to determine the eligilibity of X to inherit Y's intestate
estate in State B because the question decided in the A judgment and
that involved in the B proceeding are not the same. Both entitlement to
support and entitlement to an intestate's estate are said to hinge upon
"marriage," but the real meaning of the term "marriage" is not necessarily the same. Even if the question in B had been X's entitlement to
support in B, the A support judgment would not have been determinative. The A judgment by its own strength could only affect rights
between X and Y in A, and the contest in B concerns equivalent rights
in B. For B to take the A judgment as determining rights in B would
be to give the judgment a different effect in B than it had in A. Even
under the full faith and credit clause's requirement of "equivalent"
effect, since this requirement is not "inexorable and unqualified," there
is room for B to inquire whether the relationship which premised the
judgment in A is the kind of relationship which would entitle X to
support according to the policy of B.
There are complexities in the application of this faith and credit
analysis to twentieth century problems which this article cannot explore.
It is hoped, however, that this brief discussion will illustrate the possible
modern application of the thirteenth century English faith and credit
analysis, or at the very least, assist in understanding more clearly by
contrast, the faith and credit principles which are currently applied.12
122. See

ENGDAHL, 55

IOWA L. REv. 56, 111-14.
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